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the strength of their claims.  We evaluate their results in terms of replicability and 
robustness. While we find that their analysis meets the standard of statistical replicability, 
we do not find that the results are robust to changes in their baseline statistical 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the notable recent developments in economics has been the rise of interest 
in the study of how religion affects aggregate economic outcomes.  A key paper 
stimulating this new literature is Barro and McCleary (2003)
1.  Barro and McCleary 
provide evidence that some aspects of religious beliefs (notably belief in hell) correlate 
positively with economic growth while church attendance correlates negatively with 
growth, once one has controlled for a set of alternative growth determinants. They 
interpret their results to mean that all else equal countries with more efficient religious 
sectors – that is, religious sectors that require less church attendance input to generate a 
given level of religious beliefs output – will tend to grow faster.  While previous studies, 
e.g. Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001) and Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004), 
have identified a relationship between religious affiliations and growth in the context of a 
general search for growth determinants, the work by Barro and McCleary brought 
attention to the beliefs embodied in religious affiliations. 
The finding by Barro and McCleary that religion may be important to growth is 
an important one as it represents a new direction in the effort to identify sources of 
inequality across nations that lie outside the domain of the canonical neoclassical model.  
Explanations of this type, including geography (Sachs (2003)), institutions (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)) and ethnic 
heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al (2003)), have proven very 
valuable in understanding cross-country differences.  To the extent that religion proves 
similarly useful, it may well represent the beginning of a major new research direction.   
This paper is designed to assess the strength of the evidence for a religion/growth 
nexus in the context of Barro and McCleary’s seminal work.  We do this at two levels. 
First, we reevaluate their statistical analysis. This reevaluation includes both strict 
replication questions, i.e. can one find the results they report using their data and models, 
as well as an assessment of the robustness of their analysis to alternate statistical models. 
                                                 
1Other work in this area includes Cavalcanti, Parente, and Zhao (2004), Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2003), and Noland (2005). 
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We find that while their analysis is statistically replicable, it is not statistically robust. 
There is little evidence of a direct religion/growth nexus. Next we explore the question of 
whether religion may nevertheless be an indirect determinant of growth via growth 
proximates. We find no evidence to support this contention.  As a result, we conclude that 
God is not in the details, at least not in so far as their claims that religion matters for 
growth. 
While our analysis focuses on a specific paper, we hope the range of questions we 
ask and methods we employ will also be useful in describing how evidentiary support for 
a given growth theory should be subjected to evaluation. A problem with much of the 
empirical literature on growth is the tendency for the literature to focus on large claims 
without a commensurate degree of interest in exhaustive analysis of the strength of the 
claims. We hope that our admittedly unglamorous analysis shows the importance of the 
latter. 
Section 2 of this paper describes the Barro-McCleary data and demonstrates basic 
statistical replicability of their baseline model. Section 3 evaluates the robustness of the 
religion/growth relationship to a richer set of growth models.  Section 4 evaluates the 




2. Growth regression model and data 
 
  Barro and McCleary investigate the effects of religion on economic growth 
within the framework of linear cross-country growth regressions. The canonical form of 
such a regression is 
 
  j j R j j X R g ε π β + + =  (1) 
 
In this regression,  j g  is the average growth rate of per capita income for country  j  
across a time period [] T t t + , ,   j R  contains the set of variables of interest to the  
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researcher – in our context, this is the set of religious beliefs and church attendance 
variables (which we will refer to collectively as Religiosity variables) as well as the set of 
Religion Shares – while  j X  is a set of additional growth determinants a researcher 
wishes to control in the analysis.   
Barro and McCleary employ an unbalanced panel dataset of a total of 41 countries 
(see Table 1) over three periods 1965-74 (38 countries), 1975-84 (41 countries), and 
1985-94 (39 countries). The number of observations range from 113 to 123 across 
specifications. The dependent variable is the average growth rate of real per capita GDP 
corresponding to the three periods. The set of Religiosity measures consists of 
countrywide average responses based on survey questions reported in the three waves of 
the World Values Survey or WVS (1981-84, 1990-93, and 1995-97) as well as data from 
the International Social Survey Programme on monthly church attendance, belief in hell, 
and belief in heaven.  To minimize the loss of information Barro and McCleary construct 
single cross-sectional measures as follows. A measure of attendance or belief for a 
country is defined as the value from WVS 1990 if available.  If not, then the value from 
WVS 1981 is used. If neither of these values were available, then the values for ISSP 
1991, WVS 1995, and ISSP 1998 were used in an analogous way.  Finally, the value is 
adjusted for the average discrepancy between the two values among countries that had 
information for both years. 
Based on Barrett (1982), the data on Religion Shares include adherent shares for 
Catholic, Eastern, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant, and Other religions for 
the years 1970 and 1980. Each religion share is defined as the fraction adhering to the 
specified religion among persons who expressed adherence to some religion. The 
Catholic fraction is omitted from the regressions and thus each coefficient should be 
interpreted relative to the Catholic share. We note that Barro and McCleary generously 
provided us with the Religiosity and Religion Shares data. 
The set of additional control variables  j X  employed by Barro and McCleary 
includes time dummies for each of the three time periods, Religion Shares, as well as the 
set of variables that Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) had found to be robust determinants 
of growth. These variables, measured separately in each period, are: the log of initial per 
capita GDP, the average years of male secondary and higher school attainment, the  
4   
reciprocal of life expectancy at age 1, the average investment to GDP ratio, the log of the 
total fertility rate, the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (filtered for the usual relation 
of this ratio to the logs of population and area), the ratio of government consumption (net 
of outlays on defense and education) to GDP, the growth rate of the terms of trade 
interacted with the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, the Political Risk Services 
indicator of the rule of law, the Freedom House measure of political rights and its square, 
and the consumer price inflation rate.  We obtained the data for these additional control 
variables from various sources including Barro and Lee (1994); see the Data Appendix
2.   
To address issues of the possible endogeneity of right-hand side variables, Barro 
and McCleary instrument the Religiosity variables with a dummy variable that indicates 
the presence of a State Religion in 1970, a dummy variable that indicates the presence of 
State Regulation of religion in 1970, and a measure of Religious Plurality. This last 
variable is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index constructed from the Religion 
(adherence) Shares in 1970 and 1980 (1990 for Poland). For the calculation of this index, 
the share of Buddhism was distinguished from the share of other Eastern religions.  To 
deal with the endogeneity of Religion Shares, they use as instruments the lagged shares; 
1970 for the first two periods and 1980 for the third. The instrument list for the additional 
controls includes beginning of period or lagged values of all the covariates with the 
exception of inflation. Inflation is instrumented with the Spain and Portuguese colonial 
dummy.  
The key findings of Barro and McCleary (2003) are reported in Table 4 of that 
paper. Table 3 of this paper contains our replication results. We were able to replicate 
Barro and McCleary's results relatively closely. In particular, our replication results 
affirm Barro and Cleary's results for belief in hell and monthly church attendance.   As 
shown in Table 3, monthly church attendance is negative while belief in hell or belief in 
heaven is positive. As in Barro and McCleary these coefficients are individually and 
jointly statistical significant. There are only a few small differences in the degree of 
significance. Our replication shows stronger evidence in favor of belief in heaven but 
weaker evidence in belief in hell. More precisely, while Barro and McCleary find that 
                                                 
2 Barro and McCleary did not share most of these data with us, which will prove to have 
some, but not great, significance below.  
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belief in heaven is not significant in system (4) we find that it is significant at 1%. 
Conversely, while Barro and McCleary find that belief in hell is significant in systems in 
(5) and (6) at 1% and 0.1%, respectively, we find that they are significant at 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  We were also able to affirm the marginal significance for Muslim, 
Orthodox, and Protestant Shares.  While we were not able to confirm the statistical 
significance of the Hindu share we were able to verify the joint statistical significance of 
Religion Shares.  Overall, we conclude that Barro and McCleary’s results are generally 
statistically replicable using the data they provided. We attribute the small discrepancies 
of our replication exercise to the fact that they did not share with us their data on the set 
of additional controls. 
 
 




While Barro and McCleary’s claims appear to be statistically replicable, a 
separate question is whether they are statistically robust.  As Brock and Durlauf (2001) 
and other researchers have argued, exploring the quantitative consequences of new 
growth theories presents unique challenges to researchers.  These difficulties arise to a 
large extent because the nature of growth theories is such that they are inherently open-
ended.  By theory open-endedness, Brock and Durlauf refer to the idea that, in general, 
the statement that a particular theory of growth is relevant does not logically preclude 
other theories of growth from also being relevant.  This means that an evaluation of the 
statistical relationship between growth and religion needs to account for the plethora of 
growth determinants that exist in the empirical literature; specifically, a causal 
relationship between religion and growth has no implications for whether a causal 
relationship exists between geography and growth or any other variable.   
Dealing with theory uncertainty is therefore of first-order importance if we are 
concerned with understanding the strength of evidential support for the link between 
religiosity variables and growth.  Barro and McCleary avoid this issue by choosing to  
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include additional control variables on the basis of an assessment of what Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2003) identify as empirical important growth determinants.  But this assessment 
itself relies on a subjective reading of a body of papers that themselves suffer from a lack 
of attention to this same question Thus, they in essence engage in model selection 
without the formal specification of a common body of data, a set of models to consider, 
and a well defined metric for evaluation. 
It is also far from clear that their choices on growth controls well reflect the 
current state of empirical thinking on growth.  An important substantive problem in their 
analysis is the lack of evaluation of religion against alternative fundamental growth 
determinants, in particular institutions, geography, and ethnic heterogeneity, each of 
which has been found by other authors to be empirically important.  None of these 
alternate channels was a part of the model selection exercise employed to identify 
additional controls in the Barro and McCleary analysis.  
Finally, it is unclear that model selection is even appropriate for an exercise of 
this type. There is a range of possible growth specifications, inference on the 
religion/growth nexus should reflect the relative evidentiary support for each model, not 
be contingent on one of the models, even if there is a sense that it has the highest 
posterior probability of being the true one.  
For these reasons, we regard it as important to evaluate the robustness of their 
findings.  To evaluate robustness, we employ model averaging methods to account for the 
broad theoretical background against which a religion/growth relationship must be 
assessed.  We refer the reader to the Technical Appendix for a full description of our 
implementation of these methods. Model averaging methods have proven useful in a 
number of growth studies, see Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez, Ley and Steel 
(2001), Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Masanjala, and Papageorgiou 
(2005) for examples in the growth literature; the methodology has also proven useful in 
both macroeconomics (Brock, Durlauf, and West (2006) and Cogley and Sargent (2004)) 
and in economic forecasting (Garratt et al (2003)).  Our current application is somewhat 
different from those in that we focus on a specific theory rather than engage in a 
horserace across all theories. This strategy is chosen since our goal is to assess the  
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religion/growth relationship against the current body of growth theories, not assess all 
theories simultaneously.   
To understand the model averaging approach, suppose that a parameter vector  R β  
characterizes the effects of different Religiosity variables on growth. A standard 
frequentist exercise of the type performed by Barro and McCleary constructs estimates of 
this parameter that are conditional on D, the available data, and m, the specification of a 
growth model,  
 
  ., , j j Rm jm jm gR X β πε = ++  (2) 
 
where models are differentiated by the choice of control variables  X ; denote estimated 
religion parameters as , ˆ
RDm β .  Estimates of the uncertainty of the estimate, i.e. standard 
errors, may similarly be conceptualized as both data and model dependent. As such, this 
sort of calculation means that prior knowledge is assumed about the “true” growth 
process; i.e., that it is adequately described by model m. 
We propose, instead, to calculate objects that are interpretable as  , ˆ
RDM β , i.e. 
parameter estimates that condition on M, the collection of candidate models for the true 
growth process; we subsequently refer to this as the model space.   That is, we do not 
want to engage in analysis of a particular , ˆ
RDm β  or a small set of estimates whose 
differences are based on perturbations of a baseline model.  Rather, we ask what 
information about  R β  is found when one considers a general space of growth models.  
How is such a general model space defined? Operationally, one specifies a set of 
potential growth controls  X  and constructs all possible combinations of the elements of 
this space.  Each combination of elements, when appended to (1) defines one of the 
candidate models of the form (2).  Combination across models means that we obtain an 
average of model-specific results  , ˆ
RDm β  using model weights ( ) mD µ , i.e.  
 





= ∑  (3)  
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This formulation exhibits an important tension in incorporating model uncertainty into 
frequentist analysis: frequentist methods assign probabilities of observables (e.g. 
parameter estimates) given unobservables (e.g. the true parameters) whereas our goal is 
to eliminate the condition of an unobservable.   
One solution is to pursue a full Bayesian analysis, cf. Raftery et al (1997), etc. 
And in fact, if one assumes that the regressors are nonrandom and regression errors are 
i.i.d. normal with known variance, then under a diffuse prior on the regression 
coefficients, the posterior density of the coefficient will have the property that the 
posterior mean and variance equal the OLS estimate and variance covariance matrix. The 
weights  () mD µ  in this context are posterior model probabilities.  However, we prefer 
the interpretation developed by Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) that our 
robustness exercise is a Bayesian average of classical estimates. In other words, we will 
use model weights that have an interpretation as model probabilities, Brock, Durlauf and 
West (2003) call this approach a pseudo-frequentist analysis.  We note that this approach 
is advocated in statistics papers including Candolo, Davison, and Demétrio (2003); see 
also Hjort and Claeskens (2003) and Hansen (2006) for development of statistical theory. 
How should one understand our model weights as posterior model probabilities?  
Using Bayes’ rule  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) mD Dm m µµ µ ∝  (4) 
 
so that each weight is the product of  the likelihood of the data given a model,  () Dm µ , 
and the prior probability for a model,  ( ) m µ . The choice of priors is of course 
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3.2 Implementation 
 
In terms of our implementation, as discussed above, our aim is to nest Barro and 
McCleary’s model within a larger model space that includes recent fundamental growth 
theories. Therefore, in addition to Religiosity and Religion Shares, we focus on five other 
fundamental growth theories: Geography, Ethnic Fractionalization, Political Institutions, 
Property Rights Institutions, and Contracting Institutions. In our view, religion is on par 
with geography, institutions, and ethnic heterogeneity as a potential fundamental growth 
determinant.  While it seems clear that the weight of the empirical evidence supports the 
view that institutions
3 are in general a more salient source of growth differences than 
geography, our own view (cf. Tan (2005)) is that, at least from an a priori standpoint, 
both potentially play some role.  
In keeping with the recent “geography versus institutions” debate in the growth 
literature (see, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) and Sachs (2003)), we include a 
climate variable – the percentage of a country’s land area classified as tropical and 
subtropical via the Koeppen-Geiger system (KGATSTR) – as well as a measure of 
geographic accessibility/isolation – the percentage of a country’s land area within 100km 
of an ice-free coast (LCR100KM) under Geography. Political Institutions consist of a 
measure of democracy and its square. Here we follow Barro and McCleary (2003) who 
base their choice on work showing a nonlinear relationship between democracy and 
growth (e.g., Barro (1996)). Following Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), we distinguish 
between two types of economic institutions: Property Rights Institutions comprise of a 
measure of the risk of expropriation of private investments as well as a measure of 
constraints on executive power while Contracting Institutions is proxied by an index of 
legal formalism (CHECK) measuring the number of procedures for collecting on a 
bounced check. Finally, we proxy Ethnic Fractionalization with a measure of linguistic 
fractionalization due to Alesina et al (2003).  
                                                 
3Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002) are now standard references and 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2006) is a brilliant overview of the role of 
institutions in the growth process.  
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Next, we organize the additional covariates employed by Barro and McCleary 
(2003) into four proximate growth theories: Initial Heterogeneity (the log of initial per 
capita GDP), Gross Capital Accumulation (the average years of male secondary and 
higher school attainment and the average investment to GDP ratio), Demography (the 
reciprocal of life expectancy at age 1, the log of the total fertility rate, as well as a 
standard population growth rate variable
4 from the canonical Solow framework), and 
Macroeconomic Policy (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP, the growth rate of the terms of trade interacted with the ratio of 
exports plus imports to GDP, and the inflation rate).   
Finally, we include as a theory, Regional Heterogeneity – for a final tally of 10 
proximate and fundamental growth theories altogether – which consists of a dummy 
variable for East Asian countries and one for Sub-Saharan African countries. We refer the 





We present our main findings in Table 4 that shows classical least squares (LS; 
Column 3) and classical two-stage least squares (2SLS; Column 6) as well as BMA least 
squares (LS; Columns 1 and 2) and BMA two-stage least squares (2SLS; Columns 4 and 
5) results. We retain time period dummies in all specifications to capture the fixed time 
effects.  
The classical estimation exercises are essentially “kitchen sink” exercises; i.e., 
they refer to the largest possible model in our model space (all variables included). The 
“kitchen sink” approach has been used in growth empirics when a “horserace” between 
fundamental determinants of growth is desired (see, for instance, Rodrik, Subramanian, 
and Trebbi (2002) and Sachs (2003)). Our “kitchen sink” results provide weak evidence 
for the importance of Religiosity to growth. Although monthly church attendance is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, we only find marginal significance (at the 10% 
level) for a positive coefficient to belief in heaven (in the 2SLS case). Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
4 Logarithm of average population growth rate plus 0.05.  
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joint significance of monthly church attendance, belief in heaven, and belief in hell are 
found at the 1% level. We also find significance for Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant, and 
Other Religion shares. Hence, the “kitchen sink” findings are at least broadly compatible 
with those of Barro and McCleary (even though Barro-McCleary emphasize belief in hell 
instead of belief in heaven).  
The results for the other fundamental determinants for the “kitchen sink” case are 
also broadly consistent with those of the existing literature. We find the coefficient to 
initial income per capita to be highly significant at the 1% level and negative. A negative 
coefficient on log initial income per capita is typically taken as evidence in the literature 
that poorer countries are catching up with richer countries after controlling for 
heterogeneity. Our findings are therefore consistent with those in the existing 
“conditional convergence” literature.  
We also find that macroeconomic policies such as trade openness are highly 
significant and positive for growth while inflation is detrimental to growth. There is some 
evidence that geography may affect growth. However, the evidence does not support the 
case that climatic conditions are the reason; it appears instead that geographic 
accessibility is the key. Interestingly, we find that once trade openness is controlled for, 
greater geographic accessibility (as measured by LCR100KM) actually has a negative 
impact on growth; we do not see a natural explanation of this. We also find, similar to 
Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et. al. (2003), and Brock and Durlauf (2001), that 
ethnic fractionalization has a significant negative impact on growth. Finally, our results 
for institutions are consistent with those of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) in that we find 
strong evidence for the importance of Property Rights Institutions (expropriation risk) 
while, at least in the 2SLS case, not finding any importance for Contracting Institutions. 
Our results therefore support Acemoglu-Johnson’s thesis that it is the rules governing the 
interactions between the population and political elites rather than the rules that govern 
the interactions between individuals that appear to be more salient to growth. 
While the “kitchen sink” results are heartening in that they suggest that the model 
space is comprehensive enough to adequately represent the existing literature, they are 
contingent on the use of a very specific growth model – i.e., these claims are based on 
very specific choices of which growth determinants are included in the analysis (all of  
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them, in this case). However, as discussed in the previous section, we have no reason to 
come down so heavily on the side of any one particular model. In fact, because we wish 
to account for model uncertainty, our aim is to be agnostic about which of the many 
models in the model space is the “true” model (or is closest in some well-defined sense to 
the “true” model), and then to evaluate whether Barro and McCleary’s claims about 
linkages between religion and growth still hold up once we account for model 
uncertainty.  
We therefore turn now to our BMA results. Our key finding here is that there is 
no evidence that religious beliefs matter once we control for model uncertainty. Neither 
belief in hell nor belief in heaven is significant in either columns 2 or 5 of Table 4. The 
posterior probabilities of inclusion of these variables in the “true” model are also 
negligible at less than 1%. We find some weak evidence (at the 10% significance level) 
that monthly church attendance may have a negative effect on growth. However, without 
the positive significance for the religious beliefs variables, this result alone is insufficient 
to support Barro and McCleary’s contention that countries with more efficient religious 
sectors will tend to grow faster. The effect of religion on growth, if there is one, is likely 
to have nothing to do with the efficiency of the religious sector in generating beliefs, and 
furthermore, is not likely to be positive in the first instance. Nevertheless, overall, the 
evidence that Religiosity, as a theory, is likely to be in the “true” model is substantial. 
The posterior probability of theory inclusion for Religiosity is greater than 80%, far 
higher than the non-informative prior of 50% (see Technical Appendix). However, it is 
important to emphasize that this outcome is due solely to the high probability (about 
80%) that monthly church attendance is included in the “true” model even though its 
effect on growth is only marginally significant. 
The BMA results for the other growth determinants are surprisingly consistent 
with those in the existing literature. We find robust evidence for “conditional 
convergence” (1% level significance for a negative coefficient to initial income) as well 
as for the importance of trade openness, inflation, geographic accessibility (LCR100KM), 
ethnic fractionalization, and expropriation risk. These results are akin to the results 
obtained for the “kitchen sink” model above.   
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In terms of the probability of these theories being included in the “true” model, 
we find posterior probabilities of theory inclusion greater than 0.5 (our prior) for 
Regional Heterogeneity (0.84; because of the importance of the East Asia dummy), Initial 
Heterogeneity (1.00), Gross Capital Accumulation (0.64; because of Schooling), 
Demography (0.86; because of the inverse of life expectancy), Macroeconomic Policy 
(1.00; because of openness, government consumption, and inflation), Geography (0.87; 
because of geographic accessibility), Fractionalization (1.00), and Property Rights 
Institutions (1.00, because of expropriation risk). The posterior evidence for theory 
inclusion for Religion Shares (0.20), Political Institutions (0.001), and Contracting 
Institutions (0.004) were all essentially marginal and far lower than the 0.5 prior. These 
findings largely dovetail with the existing findings in the literature. It appears therefore 
that the main outcome of accounting for model uncertainty is, in fact, to challenge the 
robustness of results for Religiosity.  
Figures 1(a)-(c), Tables 5 and 6 provide clues as to why this might be the case. 
Figure 1 shows density plots for the coefficient to each of the Religiosity variables for the 
set of models considered under BMA. For instance, Figure 1(a) shows the density plot for 
the coefficient to monthly church attendance. In this case, the coefficients appear to be 
predominantly negative across models with concentrations of mass around -0.014 and -
0.006. It is not surprising therefore that monthly church attendance is found to have a 
negative impact on growth. However, we do not observe this same sort of “consensus” 
for belief in hell (Figure 1(b)) and belief in heaven (Figure 1(c)). In both these cases, we 
find mass accumulating around 0 as well as positive numbers close to 0.01. The fact that 
when we conduct BMA across the set of models, we find that the coefficients to these 
two latter variables are close to 0 (and insignificant) would therefore suggest that the set 
of models that generate positive coefficients to belief in hell and belief in heaven have 
lower posterior weights. This is indeed the case. Table 6 presents results for the model 
corresponding to the posterior mode. In the posterior modal model, neither belief in hell 
nor belief in heaven is included as a covariate. The posterior weight assigned to the 
posterior modal model turns out to be close to 0.5 while the next most important model 
rings in at only 0.1.  
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Another way to evaluate our model averaging results is to engage in a data mining 
exercise along the lines of Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003). Let us first consider what 
would happen if instead of model averaging, the researcher focused on particular “rules-
of-thumb” for model selection. Note that, in contrast to model averaging or model 
selection according to the posterior mode, model selection employing the following 
“rules-of-thumb” ignores the assignment of posterior evidence to models.  
Columns 1-6 of Table 5 shows results when the model corresponding to the 
minimum or maximum coefficient value for each of the Religiosity variables, 
respectively, is chosen. Columns 7-9 of Table 5 present results for the models with the 
largest absolute values
5 of the coefficient to each respective Religiosity variable, among 
those that are statistically significant at the 5% level. As can be seen, outcomes where 
both monthly church attendance is negative and significant and belief in hell is positive 
and significant occur if the researcher chooses (1) the model with the minimum 
coefficient value for monthly church attendance, (2) the model with the maximum 
coefficient value for belief in hell, or (3) the model with the largest coefficient to belief in 
hell which is statistically significant. This is in sharp contrast to the results obtained for 
the model which corresponds to the posterior mode for the set of models considered 
under BMA (the standard Bayesian model selection rule-of-thumb). Hence, it would 
appear that in order to obtain something close to Barro-McCleary’s results, we would be 
required to abandon considerations of the relative evidentiary (posterior) weight of 
alternative models, and choose instead models which presuppose the importance of 
Religiosity variables. 
We find the latter strategy to be objectionable. However, since our model priors, 
as well as our use of the BIC approximation, directly affect the calculations for posterior 
weights, we need to assess the robustness of our findings to plausible alternative 
specifications. We address these considerations below.   
In Table 7, we report results assessing the robustness of our BMA results to 
alternative model prior specifications as well as approximations to the likelihood (please 
refer to the Technical Appendix for further details). Column 1 of Table 7 reproduces our 
baseline BMA results (Column 5 of Table 4). Columns 2 to 5 contain results for cases 
                                                 
5 We omit parallel results on minimum values as they are not economically interesting.  
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where particular subsets of variables are assumed a priori to be always included in the 
“true” model. For instance, the BMA exercises for which results are reported in column 2 
assume that the variables employed in Barro and McCleary’s baseline model are included 
in all models in the model space. Similarly, column 2 reports results for BMA exercises 
where the canonical Solow growth variables – initial income, investments, schooling, and 
population growth rates – are always included in all models. Columns 4 and 5 report 
results for exercises where, respectively, all Religiosity variables and all Religiosity and 
Religion Shares variables are retained in all models in the model space.  We also 
experiment with replacing our hierarchical model priors with uniform priors. That is, we 
disregard any theoretical distinctions between variables so that instead of having each of 
the 10 growth theories be assigned a .5 prior probability of being included in the “true” 
model, we allow each individual variable instead to have a .5 prior probability of being 
included in the “true” model. Uniform priors are an alternative means of specifying non-
information about which model in our model space is the “true” model (or, is closest to it 
in some well-defined sense). As we discuss in the Technical Appendix, however, the use 
of uniform priors, while standard practice in the literature, may nevertheless, be 
inappropriate in the growth context. In any case, these results are reported in column 6. 
Finally, column 7 reports results for exercises where instead of using Raftery’s BIC 
approximation for the likelihood, we use the AIC instead. The effect of using the AIC 
instead of the BIC is to allow for a smaller penalty on larger models.  
We find that our baseline results are largely robust to these perturbations. Only in 
the case where both Religiosity and Religion Shares are a priori assumed to be in the 
“true” model (column 5) do we obtain results comparable with those of Barro and 
McCleary; i.e., a positive and significant coefficient for belief in hell along with a 
negative and significant coefficient for monthly church attendance. In all other cases, we 
find evidence – akin to our baseline results – that, of the set of Religiosity variables, only 
monthly church attendance is significant (and negative). This finding suggests yet again 
that Barro and McCleary’s results on the importance of religiosity to growth, as well as 
the interpretation they attach to their results, are heavily contingent on their particular 
model specification.  
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In conclusion, the key finding of our robustness analysis is that religious beliefs 
(in belief in hell or belief in heaven) are not robust determinants of economic growth. At 
the same time and consistent with the existing literature we find robust evidence for 
Initial Heterogeneity (that is, conditional convergence), Macroeconomic Policy as 
manifested by trade openness and inflation, Geography as measured by geographic 
accessibility, Ethnic Fractionalization as measured by linguistic fractionalization, and 
Property Rights Institutions as measured by expropriation risk. There is also some weak 
evidence in favor of Demography, vis-à-vis the reciprocal of life expectancy at age 1.    
 
 
4. Proximate versus Ultimate 
 
Given that we found extremely little evidence of a direct link between Religiosity 
and growth, in this section, we investigate whether there is evidence for an indirect 
relationship between Religiosity and growth through proximate variables.  
We first consider the set of proximate variables that correspond to those typically 
employed in the canonical Solow growth regression; i.e., investment, schooling, 
population growth, and initial income. We carry out BMA regressions on each of the 
Solow variables on the three period dummies, Religiosity, Religion Shares, the other 
fundamental determinants, regional heterogeneity and initial income
6. We present our 
results in Table 8 (columns 1-4).  These results were obtained using the hierarchical 
priors and BIC information criterion
7 as described in the Technical Appendix. Table 9(a) 
presents the posterior probability of theory inclusion results for these Solow variables.  
                                                 
6 Except for the case where the dependent variable is initial income, then this variable is 
dropped from the right hand side. 
 
7 To investigate the robustness of our findings we obtained results (not reported) under 
the AIC information criterion and uniform priors. Our baseline findings are largely robust 
to these alternatives. 
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Our main finding is that none of the Religiosity variables are significant for any of 
the Solow variables
8. Nevertheless, the Religiosity variables may matter “collectively” 
for population growth as suggested by the high posterior probability of theory inclusion. 
This probability is close to 1 for population growth while it is negligible for the other 
Solow variables (especially given that the prior for this probability was set to 0.5).   This 
result suggests that while it is highly likely that Religiosity is a legitimate explanatory 
theory of population growth, nevertheless, its expected quantitative effect, once we 
account for model uncertainty, is likely to be inconsequential.  
In terms of the Religion Shares we find evidence that Religion Shares influence 
population growth and income but there is no evidence that they affect investments or 
schooling. The posterior probability of inclusion for Religion Shares as a theory is close 
to 1 for both population growth and initial income, about 0.58 for investments, and only 
0.08 for schooling.  More precisely, we find that the Jewish share is positively significant 
at the 1% level as a determinant of population growth.  There is also strong evidence at 
the 1% significance level that the Muslim and Hindu shares are negatively related to 
initial income
9.   
The evidence for the effect of other fundamental determinants on Solow 
proximates is richer. First, at least “collectively” we find that Regional Heterogeneity is 
primarily important for schooling and, to a lesser degree, also for investments and initial 
income. Specifically, the East Asia dummy is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
for both investments and schooling. The Sub-Saharan African dummy is only important 
in the initial income equation. Initial income appears to be important for investments and 
especially schooling. Particularly, initial income is positive and statistically significant at 
1% in the schooling equation. 
                                                 
8 We do find, however, that some Religiosity variables are significant when we employ 
either uniform model priors in place of hierarchical priors or use the AIC as an alternative 
to the BIC approximation. Specifically, belief in heaven appears to be positively and 
significantly (at the 5% level) correlated with population growth rates, while monthly 
church attendance appears to be negatively and significantly (at the 5% and 10% levels) 
correlated with them as well. 
 
9 The evidence for Eastern religion and Protestant share is less robust as they are 
positively related to initial income (at the 1% level) only for the case of hierarchical 
priors and AIC.  
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Geography appears to have an effect on population growth and initial income. 
KGATRSTR (i.e., climate) positively affects both population growth and initial income 
at 1%, while LCR100km (i.e., geographic isolation) only affects initial income (negative 
and statistically significant at 5%). Fractionalization appears to be a rather weak theory in 
terms of its effect on the Solow variables. We find that the coefficient to Language is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% in the population growth and initial income 
equations only when we replace our BIC approximation with AIC. In contrast, the impact 
of institutions on the Solow variables is as large and important as its direct impact on 
growth. We find that Property Rights, as measured by Expropriation Risk, negatively 
affect both population growth and investments (at the 1% level), while Contracting 
Institutions, as measured by Check, negatively affects schooling (at the 1% level)
10. In 
contrast, the evidence for an important role for Political Rights appears to be 
comparatively weaker.  Political Rights and its square are only statistically significant in 
the initial income equation but the evidence is not robust for different priors or 
information criteria. Nevertheless, the posterior probability for inclusion of Political 
Rights, as a theory, is close to 1 in the initial income equation. 
We now turn our attention to the non-Solow proximate determinants; i.e., the 
reciprocal of life expectancy at age 1, the logarithm of fertility rate, openness (filtered), 
government consumption (net), growth rate of the terms of trade interacted with the ratio 
of exports plus imports to GDP, and the inflation rate. Please refer to tables 8 (columns 5-
10) and 9(b) for the corresponding results. 
The results for Religiosity are more interesting for this case. We find that belief in 
heaven exerts a positive and significant (at the 1% level) influence on log fertility rate 
and government consumption, while belief in hell has a negative and significant (also at 
the 1% level) impact on government consumption. Monthly church attendance is not 
significant for any of these proximate determinants. Nevertheless, Religiosity, as a 
theory, appears to be important for fertility, government consumption, as well as 
openness. As shown in table 9(b), the probability of theory inclusion for Religiosity in 
each of these cases is very high; much larger than the 0.5 prior. Nevertheless, none of the 
                                                 
10 These results for institutions are robust for both uniform and hierarchical priors as well 
as for both BIC and AIC.  
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individual Religiosity variables themselves are significant for either openness or the 
inflation rate – the two variables that were shown to be robust determinants of growth in 
section 3 above. 
Religion Shares appear to be important for determining government consumption. 
Countries with higher shares of Hindu and Protestant adherents tend to have significantly 
higher levels of government consumption. Countries with higher Hindu shares also 
appear to experience significantly higher rates of mortality (as measured by the reciprocal 
of life expectancy at age 1). Table 9(b) also shows that Religion Shares, as a theory, 
appears to be important for fertility. The posterior probability of theory inclusion for 
Religion Shares is 0.63 which is larger than the 0.5 prior. Nevertheless, none of the 
religion shares themselves appear to have a significant effect on log fertility rates 
suggesting that the expected quantitative effect of this theory, once model uncertainty is 
accounted for, is minimal.  
In terms of the effects of the other fundamental growth determinants on these 
non-Solow proximate determinants, we find that more tropical areas (in terms of 
KGATRSTR) have a significantly higher (at the 1% level) mortality rate (as measured by 
the inverse of life expectancy at age 1). However, they also have significantly higher 
(log) fertility rates. We also find that countries with better Property Rights institutions (as 
measured by Expropriation Risk) have significantly lower inflation and enjoy 
significantly higher levels of trade openness. Trade openness is also positively and 
significantly (at the 1% level) influenced by greater geographic accessibility (as 
measured by LCR100KM).  This finding is consistent with the existing literature 
suggesting landlockedness is detrimental to trade integration (see, Radelet and Sachs 
(1998) and Frankel and Romer (1999)).  We remind the reader that in Table 4, we found 
that conditional on trade openness, accessibility is negatively associated with growth, so 
that this channel helps explain the overall positive correlation between accessibility and 
growth that is part of the conventional wisdom on growth determinants.  Surprisingly, we 
also find that higher levels of ethnic fractionalization may result in higher levels of trade 
openness.  
Overall, the analysis of the indirect relationship between proximate growth 
determinants and the fundamental growth theories reveals that Religiosity is unlikely to  
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have an important indirect effect on growth. Religiosity simply does not appear to matter 
to the robust proximate growth determinants identified in section 3; i.e., initial income, 
openness, inflation, and (to a lesser extent) life expectancy. Beliefs appear to be strongly 
important for government consumption but the latter was not identified as a robust 
growth determinant. We do not uncover a critical role for Religion Shares either. The one 






In this paper, we evaluate the robustness of the link between religion and 
economic performance using Bayesian model averaging methods to account for model 
uncertainty. In sharp contrast to existing work in the literature, we find no evidence that 
the degree of religiosity is quantitatively important to growth. There is no evidence that 
religious beliefs (such as beliefs in the existence of hell or heaven) have a direct robust 
relationship with economic growth. The effect of monthly church attendance on growth, 
however, is robust, significant, and, importantly, negative. We further investigate whether 
there may be indirect effects of religion on economic growth through proximate growth 
determinants. We find no evidence to suggest that monthly church attendance and 
religious beliefs have such indirect effects through the set of proximate determinants that 
are shown to be robustly correlated with growth. Finally, our collective findings lead us 
to conclude that there is very little in the data to support the contention that a country’s 
economic performance has anything whatsoever to do with the efficiency of its religious 
sector in generating beliefs. 
We conclude by noting that it is difficult to overstate the stakes in the outcome of 
the current debates on religion’s role in economic performance. The advocacy value of 
this new area of work owes in no small measure to its potential for (mis-)application to 
important and ongoing public policy controversies. Justified or not, results from the 
empirical analysis of the religion/growth nexus will provide ammunition to proponents of 
various policy positions that are still controversial in contemporary discussions. Getting  
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the empirics right on this matter is therefore of first-order importance. We view this paper 
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Technical Appendix 
 
a. model priors 
 
As evident from equation (4) in the text, model averaging requires one to specify 
priors over the models in the model space M . This turns out to be a nontrivial task.  At 
first glance, it would appear reasonable that if a researcher does not have any a priori 
information to distinguish between models, she should assign equal prior weights to each 
model. This is, in fact, the standard practice in the literature; i.e., where there is 
uncertainty over which of the p regressors in M  are present, each of the 
p 2  models in 
the model space is assigned probability 
p − 2 . This is equivalent to assuming that the prior 
probability that a given variable is present in the “true” model is 0.5 independent of the 
presence or absence of any of the other p regressors in the model.  And in fact this prior is 
the most commonly used one in the model averaging literature.  
This uniform prior across models, however, ignores interrelations between 
different variables.  As argued in Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Brock, Durlauf and West 
(2003), the probability that one variable affects growth may be logically dependent on 
whether others do. They describe this phenomenon as being analogous to the irrelevance 
of independent alternatives (IIA) in the discrete choice literature. Why is the IIA problem 
of particular importance in the growth context? An important consideration in the growth 
literature has been to evaluate the relative importance of various fundamental growth 
theories. Our primary concern, in this paper, for instance, is to evaluate claims that 
religion is important to growth. Therefore, in principle, what a researcher would want to 
do is to start by being agnostic about the a priori validity of fundamental growth theories, 
and then examine the posterior evidence in favor of or against each of these theories after 
viewing the data.  However, if the uniform prior is employed, a researcher could 
arbitrarily increase or reduce the prior weights across theories simply by judiciously 
introducing “redundant” proxy variables for some of these theories.  
To handle these interdependencies across theories created by the introduction of 
redundant variables, we set the prior probability that a particular theory – that is, the set 
of proxy variables classified under that theory – is included in the “true” model to 0.5 to 
reflect non-information across theories. This prior specification also assumes that theories  
   
are independent in the sense that the inclusion of one theory in a model does not affect 
the probability that some other theory is also included.  
Growth empirics also suffer from another problem which we refer to as 
specification uncertainty. In our context, this problem translates into concerns over what 
variables out of a potentially large set adequately proxies for each theory. New growth 
theories often do not naturally translate into specific regressors for a model such as (1).  
Rather, the theories are qualitative in the sense that multiple empirical proxies exist for 
each theory. Specification uncertainty results in dependencies between potentially 
irrelevant proxy variables within theories. If we ignore these dependencies by assigning 
uniform weights across all possible combinations of variables classified under each 
theory, then analogous to the discussion above, we would end up putting excess prior 
weights on many similar, but not very informative combinations while taking weight 
away from more unique and informative alternatives. 
To deal with this problem, we introduce a version of George’s (1999) dilution 
priors. Given that a theory T  is a priori relevant, we assign to each possible combination 
of variables classified under this theory  T γ  the following conditional prior probability, 

















where  T p  is the number of proxy variables for theory T ,  5 . 0 = j π  for  T p j ,..., 1 = , and 
T Rγ  is the correlation matrix for the set of variables included in  T γ . Since  | |
T Rγ  goes to 
1 when the set of variables are orthogonal and 0 when the variables are collinear, these 
priors are designed to penalize models with many “redundant” variables while preserving 
weights on unique and informative combinations. Figure 2 shows our model priors as 
represented by a hierarchical tree structure.
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11Other proposals to deviate from “flat” model priors have been advanced in the 
literature. For instance, Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) alter the 
probability of variable inclusion in order to give greater weight to models with a small 
number of regressors. Brown, Vannucci, and Fearn (1998, 2002) assume that the 
probability a given variable is included is itself a random variable drawn from some 
distribution. This allows different variables to be included with different probabilities. 
However, the IIA assumption remains common to these approaches.  
   
b. model posteriors and within-model posteriors 
 
Our aim is to derive estimates and standard errors for the coefficients to the 
religiosity variables once uncertainty over models has been properly accounted for. That 
is, we seek to compute posterior moments of interest such as the posterior expectation 
and variance which are given by, respectively,   
 
  () ( ) ( ) D m m D E D E
M m
R R | , | | µ β β ∑
∈
=     
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µ β β µ β β ∑ ∑
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which require computing posterior model probabilities.  To do this, we follow Raftery 
(1995) and approximate the log of the likelihood  ( ) m D | µ  in equation (4) of the text with 
the BIC. For robustness, we will also alternatively employ the AIC adjustment. We also 
follow Raftery’s suggestion and replace  ( ) m D E R , | β  with the MLE estimator,  m MLE R , , ˆ β . 
This approach may also be interpreted as a Bayes/frequentist hybrid.  Chipman, 
George, and McCulloch (2001) show that weighting models according to AIC or BIC is 
equivalent to a decision problem where Bayesian model averaging is carried out using 
priors over within-model parameters of the normal-inverse gamma form (calibrated to 
particular values) and uniform model priors, and where the objective is to minimize a 
general information criterion with a particular fixed penalty for complexity. 
Finally, our method also allows for a simple strategy for assessing the posterior 
probability that a variable, a theory, or a joint set of theories is included in the “true” 
model. To do so, we simply sum up the posterior model probabilities conditional on one 




A m D m , | µ  where  A could be the event 
“belief in hell is included in the model” or “at least one Religiosity variable is included in 
the model”, etc. 
  
   
 
Data Appendix 
Variable Description  Source 
Average Growth Rates of Real 
Per Capita GDP   Average growth rates for the periods 1965-74, 1975-84, and 1985-94.  Penn World Tables 6.1 
Time Dummy Variables   Three dummy variables for 1965-74, 1975-84, and 1985-94.   
Regional Dummy Variables  A dummy variable for East Asia and a dummy variable for sub-Saharan.    
Initial Income  Logarithm of per capita GDP at 1965, 1975, and 1985. The instruments for initial income 
include the values at 1960, 1970, and 1980.    Penn World Tables 6.1 
Population Growth Rates 
Logarithm of average population growth rates plus 0.05 for the periods 1965-74, 1975-84, 
and 1985-94.  The instruments for population growth rates include the average values of 
1960-65, 1970-75, and 1980-85. 
ibid 
Investment Share 
Average ratios over each period of investment to GDP for the periods 1965-74, 1975-84, 
1985-94.  The instruments for investments include the average values of 1960-65, 1970-75, 
and 1980-85. 
ibid 
Schooling  Years of male secondary and higher school attainment in 1965, 1975, and 1985.   Barro and Lee (2000) 
Population Growth Rates 
Logarithm of average population growth rates plus 0.05 for the periods 1965-74, 1975-84, 
and 1985-94.  The instruments for population growth rates include the average values of 
1960-65, 1970-75, and 1980-85. 
Penn World Tables 6.1 
1/ Life Expectancy at age 1  Reciprocals of life expectancy at age 1 in 1960, 1970, and 1980  Barro and Lee (1994), World 
Bank  
Log of Fertility Rate  The log of the total fertility rate in 1960, 1970, and 1980  Barro and Lee (1994), World 
Bank, UNCDB 
Openness (filtered) 
Average ratios for each period of exports plus imports to GDP, filtered for the usual relation 
of this ratio to the logs of population and area for the periods 1965-74, 1975-84, and 1985-94. 
The instruments for this variable include the average values of 1960-65, 1970-75, and 1980-
85. 
Barro and McCleary (2003) 
Government Consumption 
(net) 
Average ratios for each period of government consumption (net of outlays on defense and 
education) to GDP.  
Barro and Lee (1994), 
PWT61, GFS, SIPRI, 
UNESCO. 
Change in Terms of Trade 
times Openness 
The growth rate of the terms of trade over each period, interacted with the average ratio of 
exports plus imports to GDP 
Barro and Lee (1994), World 
Bank 
Inflation  The consumer price inflation rate for the periods 1965-74, 1975-84, 1985-94. 
Barro and Lee (1994), IFS, 
Global Development 
Network Growth Database.  
   
Variable Description  Source 
Belief in Hell  Fraction of the population who believe in hell expressed in the form oflog( /1 ) x x − .  
World Values Surveys 
(1981–1984, 1990–1993, 
1995–1997) and  
International Social Survey 
Programme (1995 and 1998) 
Belief in Heaven  Fraction of the population who believe in heaven expressed in the form of log( /1 ) x x − .   Ibid 
Monthly Church Attendance 
 
Population averages of monthly church attendance expressed in the form of log( /1 ) x x − .   Ibid 
Buddhism   Buddhism share in 1970 and 1980 expressed as a fraction of the population who expressed 
adherence to some religion.  Ibid 
Catholic   Catholic share in 1970 and 1980 expressed as a fraction of the population who expressed 
adherence to some religion.  
World Christian 
Encyclopedia (1982) 
Eastern Religion  
Eastern Religion share in 1970 and 1980 expressed as a fraction of the population who 
expressed adherence to some religion. It includes Chinese Universists, Confucians, 
Neoreligionists, Shintos, and Zoroastrians (Parsis).  
Ibid 
Hindu   Hindu share in 1970 and 1980 expressed as a fraction of the population who expressed 
adherence to some religion. It includes Hindus, Jains and Sikhs.   Ibid 
Jew  Jewish share in 1970 and 1980 expressed as a fraction of the population who expressed 
adherence to some religion.  Ibid 
Muslim   Muslim share in 1970 and 1980 expressed as a fraction of the population who expressed 
adherence to some religion.   Ibid 
Orthodox   Orthodox share in 1970 and 1980 expressed as a fraction of the population who expressed 
adherence to some religion.  Ibid 
Other Religion   Other Religion share 1970 and 1980   Ibid 
Protestant   Protestant share in 1970, 1980, and 1990 expressed as a fraction of the population who 
expressed adherence to some religion.  It includes Protestants and Anglicans.   Ibid 
KGATRSTR  Percentage of land area classified as tropical and subtropical via the in Koeppen-Geiger 
system.  
The Center for International 
Development at Harvard 
University  
LCR100km  Percentage of a country’s land area within 100km of an ice- free coast.   
The Center for International 
Development at Harvard 
University 
Language  Measure of linguistic fractionalization based on data describing shares of languages spoken 
as “mother tongues”. 
Alesina, A., A. 
Devleeschauwer, W. 
Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R.  
   
Variable Description  Source 
Wacziarg (2003) 
Political Rights and Political 
Rights Square 
We calculated the average for each period of the Freedom House measure of democracy and 
its square. Notice that the average of 1972-74 appears in the data.   Freedom House 
Rule of Law  The average of the Political Risk Services indicator of the rule of law (the value for 1982 or 
1985 appears in the first two periods 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Expropriation Risk 
Risk of “outright confiscation and forced nationalization" of property. Rescaled, from 0 to 1, 
with a higher score indicating higher less risk of expropriation.  For the first two periods of 
our sample, we use the average value of expropriation risk for 1982-84.  For the third and 
fourth periods of our sample we use the average value 1985-1994 and 1985-97, 
correspondingly.  Source: International Country Risk Guide 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Legal Formalism: Check  Index of formality in legal procedures for collecting on a bounced check, rescaled from 0 to 
1.  




This variable is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index – i.e. the probability that two 
randomly selected persons from the population would belong to different religions. This 
index can, therefore, be viewed as an indicator of religious pluralism or diversity. 
Specifically, the Herfindahl index is the sum of the squares of the population fractions 
belonging to each of nine major categories: Buddhist, Catholic, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, 
Protestant, other Eastern religions, Orthodox, and other religions. We calculate the religious 
pluralism in 1970 and 1980 (1990 for Poland).  
 
State Religion   A dummy variable that indicates the presence of state religion in 1970  Barro and McCleary (2003) 
Stage Regulation of Religion   A dummy variable that indicates the presence of state regulation in religion in 1970.  Barro and McCleary (2003) 
Ex Colony of Spain or 
Portugal  Coded zero or one. One indicates that country was colonized by Spain or Portugal.   Barro and Lee (1994), 
English Legal Origin (or 
Common Law countries) 
Coded zero or one. One indicates that country was colonized by Britain and English legal 
code was transferred. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), 
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     Table 1: List of Countries  
Code Country  Code Country 
     
North America  Asia and Oceania 
CAN Canada  AUS  Australia 
USA United  States  IND  India 
   BGD  Bangladesh   
Europe  JPN Japan 
AUT Austria  KOR Korea,  Rep. 
BEL  Belgium  NZL  New Zealand  
CY Cyprus  PHL  Philippines 
CHE Switzerland  TWN Taiwan,  China 
DEU  Germany, Fed. Rep. (former)     
DNK Denmark  Sub-Saharan Africa 
ESP Spain  GHA  GHA 
FIN Finland  ZAF ZAF 
FRA France     
GBR United  Kingdom  Latin America & Caribbean 
HUN Hungary  ARG ARG 
IRL Ireland  BRA  BRA 
ISL Iceland  CHL  CHL 
ISR Israel  DOM  DOM 
ITA Italy  MEX  MEX 
NLD Netherlands  PER  PER 
NOR Norway     
POL Poland     
PRT Portugal     
SWE Sweden     
TUR Turkey     
 
         Notes:    
   
1In Barro and McCleary (2003) Bangladesh, Hungary, and Poland were dropped from the first period 
while Germany and South Africa were dropped from the third period.   
 
2  In our extended dataset Bangladesh, Cyprus, Germany, and Iceland were dropped from all three 







Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Median  St. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
East Asia  0.11110 0.00000 0.31573 0.00000 1.00000 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.04630 0.00000 0.21110 0.00000 1.00000 
Average Growth Rates  0.02184 0.01916 0.01974  -0.02098 0.07864 
Investments  0.22504 0.22290 0.06444  0.044800  0.37450 
Schooling  2.11580 1.77100 1.30422 0.19400  5.9780 
Initial Income  8.56522 8.71568 0.77955 6.62140 9.71534 
1/ Life Expectancy at age 1  1.44483 1.38533 0.14140 1.30657 1.96941 
Log of Fertility Rate  1.15628 1.05082 0.45017 0.43825 1.99470 
Population growth Rates  -2.78022 -2.80616 0.14570 -3.06539 -2.48092 
Openness (filtered)  -0.04213 -0.06195 0.17654 -0.47032 0.64087 
Government Consumption (net)  0.07227 0.06495 0.04134 0.01000 0.23362 
Change in Terms of Trade times 
Openness 
-0.00290 -0.00264 0.01341 -0.05236 0.04734 
Inflation  0.19376 0.08564 0.30464 0.01305 2.09233 
Church Attendance  -0.36207 -0.40963 1.09993 -2.16432 2.09675 
Belief in Hell  -0.57192 -0.45898 0.92632 -2.48382 1.75832 
 Belief in Heaven  0.50843 0.28033 0.99943  -1.43706 2.36583 
Eastern Religion  0.06524 0.00000 0.22542 0.00000 0.96979 
Hindu  0.02378 0.00000 0.13561 0.00000 0.827135 
  Jews  0.02920 0.00103 0.14670 0.00000 0.895643 
Muslim  0.04163 0.00140 0.16485 0.00000 0.99299 
Orthodox  0.00565 0.00201 0.00863 0.00000 0.03525 
Other Religion  0.03564 0.00117 0.09363 0.00000 0.46940 
Protestant  0.26133 0.03472 0.34640 0.00102 0.99595 
LCR100km  0.60813 0.58210 0.31955 0.06325 1.00000 
KGATRSTR   0.20300 0.00000 0.33765 0.00000 1.00000 
Language  0.26552 0.15220 0.25130 0.00280 0.86520 
Political Rights   0.77302 0.89420 0.27187 0.11666 1.00000 
Political Rights Square  0.67079 0.79961 0.35652 0.01361 1.00000 
Expropriation Risk  0.78119 0.85150 0.18187 0.31666 1.00000 
Rule of Law  0.75470 0.83333 0.26923 0.16666 1.00000 
Legal Formalism: Check  0.40274 0.35635 0.18219 0.09649 0.83479  
 

























Belief in Hell  0.00659** 
(0.00263) 
0.01527*** 












Religion Shares  -  0.00694
ϒ  -  0.00212
ϒ  -  0.00965
ϒ 
Eastern Religion Share  -  -0.00711 
(0.00839)  -  0.00345 
(0.00803)  -  -0.00552 
(0.00896) 
Hindu Share  -  -0.01092 
(0.01174)  -  0.00612 
(0.01525)  -  0.00241 
(0.01547) 
Jewish Share  -  -0.00264 
(0.00907)  -  0.00892 
(0.00875)  -  0.00198 
(0.00926) 
Muslim Share  -  -0.03098** 
(0.01223)  -  -0.01400 
(0.00979)  -  -0.02909** 
(0.01254) 
Orthodox Share  -  -0.02966 
(0.02044)  -  -0.02169 
(0.01993)  -  -0.03289 
(0.02091) 
Protestant Share  -  -0.01661** 
(0.00698)  -  -0.02114** 
(0.00836)  -  -0.02144** 
(0.00868) 
Other Religion Share  -  -0.01271 
(0.02087)  -  -0.02160 
(0.02317)  -  -0.02110 
(0.02240) 
            
Number of  observations for 
each time period  38,41,39 38,41,39  38,41,39  38,41,39  38,41,39  38,41,39 
 
This table replicates the growth regressions in Barro and McCleary (2003a; Table 4, page 773).  The time periods are 1965– 1975, 1975–
1985, and 1985–1995. Time dummies are included each period. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP over 
1965–1975, 1975–1985, and 1985–1995.  Other growth determinants were included but coefficients are not shown. The growth 
determinants not shown are the log of per capita GDP in 1965, 1975, and 1985; years of male secondary and higher school attainment in 
1965, 1975, and 1985; reciprocal of life expectancy at age 1 in 1960, 1970, and 1980; average ratio over each period of investment to GDP; 
the log of the total fertility rate in 1960, 1970, and 1980; average ratios for each period of exports plus imports to GDP, filtered for the usual 
relation of this ratio to the logs of population and area; average ratios for each period of government consumption (net of outlays on defense 
and education) to GDP; the growth rate of the terms of trade over each period, interacted with the average ratio of exports plus imports to 
GDP; the average of the Political Risk Services indicator of the rule of law (the value for 1982 or 1985 appears in the first two equations); 
the average for each period of the Freedom House measure of political rights and its square; and the consumer price inflation rate for each 
period.  The instrument list includes beginning of period or lagged values of all the covariates with the exception of church attendance, 
belief variables, and inflation. Inflation is instrumented with the Spain or Portuguese colonial dummy. The instruments for church 
attendance and belief variables are the dummy variables for state religion and state regulation of religion, and religious pluralism. Robust 
(White) standard errors are in parentheses. “***” denotes significance at 1%, “**” at 5%, and “*” at 10%.  “ϒ” denotes joint p-value.   
  
 
   Table 4: Classical and BMA Estimation Results 









































Belief in Heaven  0.00057  0.00000 
(0.00005) 
0.00276 




Belief in Hell  0.00511  0.00002 
(0.00043) 
0.00540 




Monthly Church Attendance  0.83157  -0.00357* 
(0.00206) 
-0.01002*** 




Religion Shares  0.20143




Eastern Religion Share  0.16462  0.00239 
(0.00632) 
-0.01924 




Hindu Share  0.00513  -0.00003 
(0.00097) 
-0.01075 




Jewish Share  0.02343  0.0004 
(0.00279) 
-0.00191 




Muslim Share  0.01638  -0.00013 
(0.00152) 
-0.03924*** 




Orthodox Share  0.01948  -0.00398 
(0.03844) 
-0.56681*** 




Protestant Share  0.06029  -0.00061 
(0.00265) 
-0.0162*** 




Other Religion Share  0.00716  -0.00009 
(0.00166) 
-0.04497** 




Regional Heterogeneity  0.83895




East Asia  0.83629  0.01311* 
(0.00789) 
0.01812** 




Sub-Saharan Africa  0.00266  -0.00002 
(0.00056) 
-0.00196 




Initial Heterogeneity  0.99999
#   - 1.00000
#   - 
Initial Income  1.00000  -0.02899*** 
(0.00551) 
-0.03481*** 




Gross Capital Accumulation   0.67447




Investments 0.00585  -0.00006 
(0.00209) 
-0.04747** 




Schooling 0.67157  0.00169 
(0.00157) 
0.0033*** 









Population Growth Rates  0.00000  0.00000 
(0.00000) 
0.01204 




1/ Life Expectancy at age 1  0.87801  -0.05365** 
(0.02737) 
-0.05593** 




Log of Fertility Rate  0.00000  0.00000 
(0.00000) 
-0.01211 





Table 4 (Cont’d) : Classical and BMA Estimation Results  




































Macroeconomic Policy  0.99999
#   0.00000
ϒ  1.00000
#   0.00000
ϒ 
Openness (filtered)  0.99743  0.02484*** 
(0.00812) 
0.02726*** 





(net)  0.7571  -0.09151 
(0.05948) 
-0.08701* 




Change in Terms of Trade 
times Openness  0.04899  0.00659 
(0.03413) 
0.13642** 




Inflation 0.93884  -0.01123** 
(0.00438) 
-0.0175*** 





#   0.00000
ϒ  0.86916
#   0.00111
ϒ 
LCR100km   0.88248  -0.01290** 
(0.00619) 
-0.02499*** 




KGATRSTR   0.00176  -0.00001 
(0.00026) 
-0.01025* 





#   -  1.00000
#   - 
Language 1.00000  -0.01975*** 
(0.00606) 
-0.02075*** 




Political Institutions  0.00000
#   0.74802
ϒ  0.00116
#   0.87249
ϒ 
Political Rights  0.00000  0.00000 
(0.00000) 
0.02216 




Political Rights Square  0.00000  0.00000 
(0.00000) 
-0.01832 




Property Rights Institutions  0.99999
#   0.00098
ϒ  1.00000
#   0.00698
ϒ 
Expropriation Risk  1.00000  0.05708*** 
(0.01368) 
0.07341*** 




Rule of Law  0.05075  -0.00133 
(0.00608) 
-0.0201* 




Contracting  Institutions  0.00397
#   -  0.00383
#   - 
Legal Formalism: Check  0.00398  0.00001 
(0.00052) 
-0.02943*** 





Table 4 shows classical LS (Column 3), classical 2SLS (Column 6), LS BMA (Cols 1 and 2), and 2SLS BMA (Cols 4 and 5) results for 
the growth regression in eq. (1) of the text. The time periods are 1965–75, 1975–85, and 1985–95. Time dummies are included for each 
period. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP for each period. Following Barro and McCleary (2003) and 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) the instrument list includes the two regional dummies; real GDP per capita in 1960, 1970, and 1980; 
average ratios of investments to GDP and average population growth rates for 1960-65, 1970-75, and 1980-85; schooling in 1965, 1975, 
and 1985; reciprocal of life expectancy at age 1 in 1960, 1970, and 1980; log of the total fertility rate in 1969, 1970, and 1980; average 
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (filtered) for 1960-65, 1970-75, and 1980-85; average ratios of (net) govt. consumption to GDP for 
1965–75, 1975–85, and 1985–95; growth rate of the terms of trade over 1965–75, 1975–85, and 1985–95 interacted with the average 
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP; the Freedom House measure of political rights and its square in 1972, 1975, and 1985; lcr100km; 
KGATRSTR; Language; the average value of Expropriation Risk for the periods 1982-84 and 1985-94; Rule of Law in 1982 or 1985 and 
its average value for 1985-94. Inflation is instrumented with the Spain or Portugal colonial dummy. Religiosity variables are 
instrumented with the dummy variables for state religion, state regulation of religion, and religious pluralism. Religion shares are 
instrumented with value of the shares in 1970 (first two periods) and 1980 (third period). Contracting institutions are instrumented with 
British legal origin. Posterior robust (White) standard errors are in parentheses. “***” denotes significance at 1%, “**” at 5%, and “*” at 
10%.  “ϒ” denotes joint p-value while “#” denotes posterior probability of theory inclusion.  
  
 




Max Coefficient  Max Rule 
















































































































































































Columns (1)-(6) of this table reports the minimum/maximum LS and 2SLS coefficient estimates and standard errors for equation (1) with the smallest/largest coefficient estimates for 
each of the three religiosity variables out of all the models used in the Bayesian Model Averaging exercises of table 4.  For instance, column (1) shows coefficient estimates and 
standard errors of Monthly Church Attendance, Belief in Hell, and Belief in Heaven that correspond to the model with smallest coefficient estimate for Monthly Church Attendance 
out of all the models used in the Bayesian Model Averaging exercises. Similarly, columns (8)- (9) reports the LS and 2SLS coefficient estimates and standard errors for equation (1) 
where the coefficient estimates for the three religiosity variables plus twice the standard error is largest for all the models used in the Bayesian Model Averaging exercises and 
reported in table 4. For instance, column (7) shows coefficient estimates and standard errors of Monthly Church Attendance, Belief in Hell, and Belief in Heaven that correspond to 
the model with largest coefficient estimate plus twice the standard error for Monthly Church Attendance out of all the models used in the Bayesian Model Averaging exercises. All the 
regressors and instruments that were in included in table 4 are also included here but not shown. Robust (White) standard errors are in parentheses. “***” denotes significance at 1%, 





                              
Table 6: Posterior Mode Model  
Explanatory Variable  LS  2SLS 
 













































































This table shows the LS and 2SLS coefficient estimates and standard errors for the model that corresponds 
to the largest posterior model probability for all the models used in the Bayesian Model Averaging 
exercises and reported in table 4. The time periods are 1965–75, 1975–85, and 1985–95. Time dummies 
are included for each period. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP over 1965– 
75, 1975–85, and 1985–95. Robust (White) standard errors are in parentheses. “***” denotes significance 





Table 7: Robustness 




BIC BIC BIC BIC BIC BIC AIC 
Always Kept  None  Barro and 
McCleary  Solow Religiosity  Religiosity 
and Shares  None None 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Religiosity  0.80270
# - 0.96698
# -  - 0.99862
# 0.99978
# 






























































































































































This table presents the posterior means and std. errors for the coefficients of the religiosity variables and religion shares for seven different 
modeling averaging exercises for the growth regression described in equation (1) of the text.  The time periods are 1965– 1975, 1975–1985, 
and 1985–1995. Time dummies are included for each period. The dependent variable is always the growth rate of real per capita GDP over 
1965–1975, 1975–1985, and 1985–1995.  For all the exercises other growth determinants were included but coefficients are not shown.  In fact 
we used the same set of determinants and instruments as in table 4. Columns (1)-(5) and (7) refer to BMA exercises using Hierarchical priors 
while exercise (6) refers to a BMA exercise using Uniform priors. Exercises (1)-(6) employed the BIC approximation while exercise (7) 
employed the AIC criterion.   Finally, columns (1), (6), and (7) refer to BMA exercises that allowed for model uncertainty for all the variables. 
Column (2) corresponds to the exercise that assumed that the specification of Barro and McCleary is always kept (included) in all the models 
considered in the BMA.  Column (3) assumed that the variables suggested by Solow (i.e. population growth, investments, schooling, and initial 
income) are always kept. Column (4) assumed that the religiosity variables are always kept while column (5) assumed that both religiosity and 
shares are always kept. Notice that column (1) is identical to column (5) of table 4. Posterior robust (White) standard errors are in parentheses. 




Table 8: Proximate Determinants on Ultimate Theories (2SLS estimates) 
Variable Population  Growth  Investments  Schooling  Initial  Income 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 





















(0.11894)  - 

















































































































































Tables 8 presents 2SLS posterior means and std. errors for regressions of proximate on ultimate growth variables. The explanatory variables for all the 
regressions are the ultimate determinants (regional and initial heterogeneity, religiosity, religion shares, geography, fractionalization, political institutions, 
property rights, and contracting institutions).  We also include time dummies. As in table 4 the instrument list includes the two regional dummies; real 
GDP per capita in 1960, 1970, and 1980 (for equations (1)-(9); the Freedom House measure of political rights and its square in 1972, 1975, and 1985; 
LCR100km; KGATRSTR; Language; the average value of Expropriation Risk for the periods 1982-84 and 1985-94; the value of Rule of Law in 1982 or 
1985 and its average value for 1985-94. Religiosity variables are instrumented with the dummy variables for state religion and state regulation of religion 
and religious pluralism. Religion shares are instrumented with value of the shares in 1970 (first two periods) and 1980 (third period). Contracting 
institutions are instrumented with British legal origin.  All the BMA exercises employ Hierarchical priors and BIC approximation. Posterior robust 
(White) standard errors are in parentheses. “***” denotes significance at 1%, “**” at 5%, and “*” at 10%.   
  
 














Terms of Trade 
times Openness 
Inflation 
  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 








































































































































































































































































Variable  Population 
Growth  Investments Schooling  Income 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Regional 
Heterogeneity  0.189845 0.46123  0.99999 0.79685 
Initial Heterogeneity  0.29301 0.91577  0.99465  - 
Religiosity 1.00000  0.00337  0.04485  0.06546 
Religion Shares  0.99970  0.58488  0.08742  1.00000 
Geography 1.00000  0.40109  0.19154  1.00000 
Fractionalization 0.83425  0.53388  0.13800  0.72093 
Political Institutions  0.06397 0.08500  0.10446  1.00000 
Property Rights 
Institutions  0.99946 0.99999  0.03696  0.27684 
Contracting  
Institutions  0.016373 0.10178  0.99999 0.03357 
 
This table summarizes the posterior inclusion probabilities for the 2SLS-BMA exercises based on Hierarchical priors and BIC 
approximation for the regressions of population growth, investments, schooling, and initial income on the ultimate determinants 
reported in table 8.  This probability is calculated as 1 minus the probability of non-inclusion for any variable that belongs to the 
theory in question. The time periods are 1965– 1975, 1975–1985, and 1985–1995. All the regressions include as explanatory 
variables, time dummies, East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Belief in Heaven, Belief in Hell, Monthly Church Attendance, Eastern 
Religion Share, Hindu Share, Jewish Share, Muslim Share, Orthodox Share, Protestant Share, Other Religion Share, 
LCR100km, KGATRSTR, Language, Political Rights, Political Rights Square, Expropriation Risk, Rule of Law, and Check. 
The regressions of Population Growth, Investments, and Schooling (Columns (1)-(3)) also include Initial Income as an 
explanatory variable.  The list of instruments is described in table 8. 
  
 







at age 1 







 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Regional 
Heterogeneity 
0.99999 0.1777  0.04095  0.23840  0.04438  0.13942 
Initial Heterogeneity  0.99999 1.00000  0.05896 1.00000  0.10969 0.10593 
Religiosity  0.24271 1.00000  0.72788 1.00000  0.03797 0.04545 
Religion Shares  0.99999 0.62815  0.00243  1.00000  0.00072 0.00847 
Geography  0.99982 0.99824  0.95947  0.07508  0.04153  0.41582 
Fractionalization  0.01736 0.04103  0.99821  0.04180  0.08812  0.75313 
Political Institutions  0.04667 0.02724  0.09390  0.17084  0.62937  0.05745 
Property Rights 
Institutions 
0.33624 0.34181  1.00000  0.05215 0.24724  1.00000 
Contracting  
Institutions 
0.12938 0.02593  0.041838  0.03334  0.08140  0.04159 
 
This table summarizes the posterior inclusion probabilities for the 2SLS-BMA exercises based on Hierarchical priors and BIC approximation for the 
regressions of the reciprocal of life expectancy at age 1, log of the total fertility rate, openness (filtered),  government consumption (net); the growth 
rate of the terms of trade times openness; and inflation on the ultimate determinants as reported in of table 8.   This probability is calculated as 1 minus 
the probability of non-inclusion for any variable that belongs to the theory in question.. The time periods are 1965– 1975, 1975–1985, and 1985–1995. 
All the regressions include as explanatory variables, time dummies, Initial Income, East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Belief in Heaven, Belief in Hell, 
Monthly Church Attendance, Eastern Religion Share, Hindu Share, Jewish Share, Muslim Share, Orthodox Share, Protestant Share, Other Religion 
Share, LCR100km, KGATRSTR, Language, Political Rights, Political Rights Square, Expropriation Risk, Rule of Law, and Check. The list of 
instruments is described in table 8. 
 